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CONVERGENCE OF DIVORCE LAWS IN EUROPE 
Masha Antokolskaia,* Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
Introduction 
The question whether or not family law within Europe has been and is converging remains 
controversial.1 Jacques Fayer wrote in 1978 that ‘a classical aphorism of comparative law, that 
while the law of property and obligations tends towards homogeneity, family law remains the seat 
of national idiosyncrasies […] which has been beyond dispute for some ten year ago’2 was losing 
its validity as ‘the laws of the majority of the countries of Western Europe tended to converge 
towards a uniform model, and this evolution has been very rapid.’3 This idea is supported up to the 
present day by some eminent contemporary scholars.4 At the same time the existence of 
convergence is persistently denied by another camp.5  Both sides are able to invoke empirical 
evidence as the history of family law in Europe includes both periods showing a clear tendency 
to divergence as well as periods when the convergence trend was dominating. Thus the mere 
choice of a period of investigation can be decisive for the outcome of one’s research.6 My 
hypothesis is that the different appreciation of the convergence/divergence tendency often has to 
do with the examination of too short-span periods. Studying the convergence issue it is quite easy 
to fall into the trap of selectiveness focusing only at those periods which tend to affirm one’s 
starting point.   
 
* Professor of Private law of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. This research has been made 
possible by a fellowship from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. 
1 See for the overview: Bradley, D., ‘A Family Law For Europe? Sovereignty, Political Economy and Legitimation’, 
in: Boele-Woelki, K. (ed), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, European 
Family Law Series No. 4, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003, p. 89-90 
2 FOYER, J., ‘The Reform of Family Law in France’, in: CHLOROS, A., (ed.), The Reform of Family Law in Europe, 
Kluwer, Deventer, 1978, p. 75.  
3 FOYER, J., ‘The Reform of Family Law in France’ (1978), p. 75.  
4 ‘In Europe the movement towards uniformity is more evident [than in USA].’ PHILLIPS, R., Putting Asunder: A 
history of divorcé in Western Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 570. In the same sense see 
also: Pintens, W., Vanwinckelen, C., Casebook. European Family Law, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2001, p. 
16. 
5 BRADLEY, D., ‘Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and Political Economy’, 6 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law  (1999), p. 128-150. 
6 Willekens has rightly noticed that: ‘A purely synchronic comparison or one restricted to developments within, say, 
“recent years” or a certain decade, will easily miss the point and will give the impression of fundamental differences, 
where the a comparison over a more extended period of time would rather point to mere time lag.’ WILLEKENS, H., 
‘Explaining Two Hundred Years of Family Law in Western Europe’, Vuga, The Hague, 1997, p. 60. 
 In this paper the convergence question will be approached via the search for the common 
core of the law on divorce throughout the last half millennium of its history. It will be argued that 
the tendency towards modernisation and liberalisation of divorce is generally apparent from the 
reintroduction of divorce after the Reformation in the Protestant countries in the 16th century up 
to the present day. To derive a tendency of convergence from this ongoing process of 
modernisation however, entails a patent shortcut.  
 During the described period divorce laws have evolved from fault-based divorce (divorce 
as sanction) to divorce based on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage (divorce as remedy 
or failure) and divorce by mutual consent (divorce as an autonomous decision by the spouses 
themselves), and now probably is evolving even further: to the divorce on demand (divorce as a 
right). These different types of divorce law are inspired by different visions on the balance 
between the role of the state in the divorce process and the autonomy of the spouses. The first 
concept - divorce as sanction - is rooted in the idea of the state and/or the church as the guardians 
of universal morality, which have to punish the spouse who has committed a matrimonial offence 
and release the innocent spouse from the bond with the offender. The second concept - divorce as 
remedy or failure - is based on two assumptions: the communitarian idea that the state has to 
protect the stability of marriage for the sake of society at large, and a paternalistic belief that the 
spouses have to be protected from their ill-considered decisions to their own benefit.  Therefore a 
divorce could only be granted when the competent authority was convinced that the marriage 
could not be saved. The third concept - divorce by mutual consent - is founded in the acceptance 
of the fact that nobody is in a better position to decide on the dissolution of the marriage than the 
spouses themselves. The fourth concept –divorce on demand - is inspired by the belief that a 
marriage cannot be kept intact if even one of the spouses wishes to terminate it. Consequently, 
divorce has to be granted upon the unilateral request of one of the spouses. These different 
concepts of divorce have taken shape in different times and could be perceived as various 
generations of divorce law.7 However, due to the dissimilarity in the timing of the liberalisation 
of divorce law in different countries, all four historical types are simultaneously present in 
contemporary Europe. This paper will thus first provide a brief historical overview of the 
                                                 
7 Phillips has developed an edifying, although not all-embracing periodisation of divorce law: first generation - the 
Protestant laws of the sixteenth century; second generation - ‘the widespread legalisation and liberalisation of 
divorce legislation in the latter half of the nineteenth century’, and third generation - the non-fault movement of the 
1960s –1970s. Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 571. 
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appearance of the different divorce law generations and then search for the common core of the 
current divorce law on the basis of a new source of information: the National Reports8 of the 
Commission on European Family Law (CEFL).9      
 
The Protestant Reformation: Appearance of Fault-Based Divorce 
Before the Reformation the doctrine of the indissolubility10 of marriage was one of the most 
important parts of the canon law on marriage and divorce of the Roman Catholic Church which 
was the uniform law of the whole area of Western Christendom.11 This is the medieval ius 
commune for family law, the initial point from which the process of the development of the law 
on divorce in Western Europe12 originally started. From this time onwards, using the portrayal by 
Phillips, ‘for the most part, the history of divorce since the sixteenth century has been one 
movement away from the Roman Catholic doctrines of marriage.’13   
 After the Reformation Western Europe became split into Catholic and Protestant camps. 
The former strictly adhered to the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage while the latter 
allowed full divorce and remarriage.14  
 The historically first15notion: a fault-based divorce as sanction, was initially elaborated in 
Protestant theological thought.  Protestant reformers considered that the dissolution of marriage 
was not to be seen ‘as a remedy for marriage breakdown as such but as a punishment for 
                                                 
8 At the beginning of 2002 the CEFL produced detailed national reports on the grounds for divorce, representing 
twenty-two European jurisdictions. The integral reports are to be found on the CEFL website:  
www.law.uu.nl/priv/cefl. These reports have been compiled by national experts - members of the CEFL on the basis 
of a questionnaire specially drafted for this purpose. In 2003 these reports were compiled in two volumes structured 
along the lines of each question posed in the questionnaire, so after each question the answers given by each country 
report are provided. See: Boele-Woelki, K., B. Braat, B., Sumner I., (eds), European Family Law in Action, Volume 
I: Grounds for Divorce, European Family Law Series No. 2, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003; Boele-Woelki, K., B. Braat, 
B., Sumner I., (eds), European Family Law in Action, Volume 2: Maintenance Between Former Spouses, European 
Family Law Series No. 3, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003. Further referred to by reference to the author and the 
jurisdiction of the National Report only.  
9 Established in 2001 as an academic initiative in order to elaborate The Principles of European Family Law that 
could provide a model for voluntary bottom-up harmonisation of family law in Europe.  
10 Indissolubility only became really enforced in the eleventh - twelfth centuries and was formally made a part of 
canon law by the Tametsi degree of the Council of Trent (1563). Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 27.  
11 The Orthodox Eastern European countries were, strictly speaking, never part of this ius commune.  
12 In the Orthodox Eastern European countries the doctrine of indissolubility has never completely prevailed. 
Divorce and remarriage remained available subject to a very restrictive procedure and for a very few grounds 
comparable to those developed by the early Protestantism.  
13 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 1. 
14 Lacey, T., Marriage in Church and State, SPCK, London, 1947, p.150. 
15 After the re introduction of divorce following the period of indissolubility. 
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matrimonial crime and as a relief for the victim of the crime’. 16 Therefore the petitioner had to be 
demonstrably innocent and many divorce laws only permitted remarriage for the innocent 
spouse.17 The guilty spouse had to be severely punished ‘if not by death, then by banishment or 
imprisonment or fine’.18 Although  during the Protestant Reformation the formal dissolution of 
marriage became possible, it is difficult to ascribe the Protestant theologians any intention to 
liberalise the family law.19 The introduction of divorce in the Reformed countries was therefore 
by no means a recognition of the individual’s liberty to escape from an unhappy marriage. 
Divorce, irrespective of the competent authority (state or ecclesiastical), was strictly regulated 
and extremely difficult to obtain.20
 All protestant reformers unanimously accepted adultery as a ground for divorce,21 and 
most of them also accepted desertion.22 More liberal Lutheran reformers, notably Bucer and 
Zwingli, advocated additional grounds.23 The husband and the wife had an equal right to sue for 
divorce. The theologians of the Church of England were initially also inclined to admit divorce;24 
however, in the early seventeenth century it became clear that a full divorce was not accepted by 
the Church of England.25  
 Divorce based on the ‘biblical’ Protestant grounds started to spread all over Protestant 
Europe in the early sixteenth century.  The Lutheran theology influenced the divorce law in 
Scandinavia and Germany. Calvin’s teaching on marriage influenced the French Huguenots, The 
Dutch, the Scottish Presbyterians, and The English Puritans.26 England remained the only 
protestant country that retained the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage and did not 
                                                 
16 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 90. 
17 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 90. 
18 Lacey, T., Marriage in Church and State (1947), p.149.  
19 Harrington has noticed that ‘it would be difficult to characterise [the Protestant reformers’] overwhelming concern 
with sexual order and discipline as “ progressive,” yet this has all too often been the case among scholars of the 
Reformation when referring to the reintroduction of divorce’. HARRINGTON, J., Reordering Marriage and Society in 
Reformed Germany, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 90. For an opposite view see: OZMENT, S., When 
Fathers Ruled: Family Life in Reformation Europe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, p. 99 ff. 
20 The same equally applies to the availability of divorce in the Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe. 
21 Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract. Marriage, Religion, and Law in Western Tradition, Westminster John 
Knox Press, Louisville, 1997, p. 68. 
22 Although in Calvin thought desertion was not merely a separate divorce ground but a virtual form of adultery. 
Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract  (1997), p. 102. 
23 Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract (1997), p. 69. 
24 Influential theologians proposed a limited legalisation of divorce in the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century. 
Stone, L., Road to Divorce. England 1530-1987, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 303. 
25 Stone, L., Road to Divorce. England 1530-1987 (1990), p. 305. 
26 Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract (1997), p. 126. 
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introduce a full divorce after the Reformation.27 However, after 1670 it became possible to obtain 
a divorce by a private act of Parliament.    
 Was there any convergence tendency in respect of family law during the early 
Reformation? The answer to this is a question of perception. On the one hand, the main event in 
Western Europe was the transformation from the uniformity of Roman Catholic canon law to the 
Protestant-Catholic dichotomy in the first place, and the mutual diversity among the Protestant 
laws in the second place. On the other hand, the Reformation was an extra-national phenomenon. 
The states influenced by the same denomination or Reformed thought had similar divorce laws.28  
 The Protestant doctrine regarding marriage and divorce was not a radical break with 
canon law. This tempted many scholars to underplay the divergence between the Protestant and 
the Catholic marriage and divorce laws.29 Some academics even went so far as to claim that the 
medieval ius commune continued to exist in spite of the Reformation.30 There were also 
suggestions that despite the Protestant rejection of the Catholic doctrine of the indissolubility of 
marriage the ‘attitude towards divorce was also not so radically different in practice as […] the 
nondissolubilist - dissolubilist dichotomy might suggest.’31 However, regardless of how valid 
these arguments may be, it is quite clear that divergence advanced with the coming of the 
Reformation. In the protestant countries divorce, for the first time after centuries of dominance 
by Catholic doctrine, became possible again. And this difference cannot be underrated. 
                                                 
27 Partly due to historical accident, partly due to ‘the tortuous and zig-zag path by which it moved from the Catholic 
into the Protestant camp’ Stone, L., Road to Divorce. England 1530-1987 (1990), p. 301. 
28 For instance the reform of marriage law in England in the spirit of the Reformation was much slower and far less 
radical than on the continent. Helmholz, R., Marriage Litigation in Medieval England, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1978, p. 3. 
29 As Glendon assumed, ‘secular government simply took over much of the ready-made set of the canon law’. (Glendon, 
M.A., The Transformation of Family Law,The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1989, p. 31.) Esmein 
proposed that the Catholic notion of marriage was being reused in the protestant countries ‘like a twig being 
detached from the trunk and planted in the soil.’ Esmein, A., Le marriage en Droit Canonique, p. 34. 
30 So Safley alleged that both Protestant reforms and the Tredentine reform of marriage and divorce law ‘were 
isolated elements in a far larger marital code, which remained unchanged upon both sides of the religious division of 
the period’. (Safley, T., Let No Man Put Asunder: The Control of Marriage in the German Southwest. A 
Comparative study 1500-1600, Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, Kirksville, 1984, p. 38.) And Witte affirmed 
that ‘canon law remained part of the common law (jus commune) of Protestant and Catholic Europe until the legal 
reforms and codification movement of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.’ Witte, J., From Sacrament to 
Contract (1997), p. 44.  
31 ‘The reluctance of the Catholic church’s courts to act in separations a mensa et thoro and in annulments of 
marriages, which has been documented by scholars such as Helmholz, is strongly reminiscent of the policy of the 
courts of the Protestant states apparently applied in respect of divorce.’ Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 93. 
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 Enlightenment and the French Revolution: The Cradle of the Modern Attitude Towards 
Divorce  
The period of Enlightenment was the cradle of the concepts of divorce as the breakdown of 
marriage and divorce by consent. The Enlightenment thinkers developed some basic arguments 
for liberal divorce which have not lost their validity until the present days.32 Not only much of 
the modern philosophy of divorce was introduced at that time, but also the political colour of the 
advocates and opponents of the liberalisation of divorce that would persist over the centuries, 
started to become clear. The church for the first time in almost a millennium had lost the lead in 
developing marriage and divorce doctrine. Both Catholic and Protestant churches had to 
reposition from the instigator and promoter of the legal changes to the opponent of the changes 
inspired by secular promoters. Henceforth (apart from a few exceptions), a common tendency of 
association of political liberalism with adherence to liberal divorce law and of political 
conservatism with adherence to a restrictive attitude towards divorce became visible.33
 The thinkers of the Enlightenment developed a contractarian secular theory of marriage,34 
based on deism, individualism, and rationalism.35 The French Philosophers embraced a new 
individualistic view of marriage as a union based on the sentiment of love36 and as a ‘means to 
personal happiness’, leaving behind the old communitarian vision of marriage as a ‘conventional 
social and economic relationship.’37 Such a perception naturally necessitated a change in the 
notion of divorce. The theorists of the French Enlightenment no longer saw divorce as a 
punishment for an offence but as a remedy for the breakdown of marriage,38 and they proposed 
that the divorce grounds should be expanded beyond matrimonial fault.39 They also saw divorce 
                                                 
32 In the course of the twentieth century the Enlightenment contractual model of marriage ‘slowly eclipsed Protestant 
and Catholic models of marriage and the ideas and the institution that those models have introduced into the Western 
legal tradition.’ Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract  (1997), p. 196. 
33 Philips admitted that, although this is a generalisation and that it is easy to point to the exceptions, ‘[i]n general, 
though, the associations of political liberalism with positive attitude towards divorce, and political conservatism with 
negative attitudes towards divorce, are a useful rule of thumb.’ Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 534. 
34 Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract  (1997), p. 196. 
35 Witte, J., From Sacrament to Contract  (1997), p. 197. 
36 Traer, J., Marriage and the Family in the Eighteenth-Century France’, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1980, p. 70-
71. 
37 Traer, J., Marriage and the Family in the Eighteenth-Century France’ (1980), p. 49. 
38 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 172. 
39 For instance, Morelly advocated divorce by mutual consent or unilaterally, Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 
166. 
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as a means to improve the position of women, ‘as the ability of women to divorce would be a 
useful counterweight to male authority.’ Therefore Montesquieu proposed to grant the right to 
unilateral repudiation only to women.40  
 The Enlightenment thought inspired a whole wave of reforms of family laws emanating 
from sources as different and the Enlightened monarchs and the French Revolution.  
 The most significant of the codifications inspired by the Enlightenment ideas was the 
1794 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten of Frederick William of Prussia. For 
the first time since Roman times divorce by mutual consent was re-introduced for the childless 
couples.41 A real innovation was allowing divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of 
marriage:42 the childless couples could also dissolve their marriage in case manifested such 
‘fierce and deep hatred’ of one spouse towards the other ‘that there was no hope of reconciliation 
or achieving the goals of marriage.’43  
 Under the Ancien Régime marriage was indissoluble in France in compliance with the 
Catholic doctrine. The Divorce law of 20 September 1792 enacted during the high-point of the 
Revolution ‘gave France one of the most liberal and permissive divorce policies that have ever 
been applied on a national basis in the Western society.’44 Besides a broad number of specific 
grounds, divorce was permitted by mutual consent and on the ground of incompatibility of 
temperament.45 Divorce was introduced ‘almost solely for the ideological reason that the facility 
to dissolve a marriage was an indispensable element of the freedom the revolution bestowed upon 
the French people’.46 Revolutionary divorce law was attacked immediately after the 
Thermidorian seize of power. At the time of the Directory divorce became ‘a political symbol, 
rather than simply one aspect of marriage and family law’47 for both its republican defenders and 
conservative adversaries. During the Napoleon Empire unilateral divorce for reasons of 
incompatibility of temperaments was abolished, but divorce by mutual consent was retained in 
                                                 
40 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 171. 
41 MÜLLER-FREINFELS, W., Eche und Recht,  Mohr, Tübingen, 1962, p. 22. 
42 BONE, E., VON, ‘Comparaison entre le droit au divorce dans la République Batave (1798-1806) et dans 
l'Allgemeines Landrecht für die der Preussischen Staaten’ (2001), p. 173-186. 
43 Para 718a of ALR. 
44 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 159. 
45 Phillips, R., Family Breakdown in Late Eighteenth Century France. Divorces in Rouen 1972-1803, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 11-12. 
46 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 180. 
47 Traer, J., Marriage and the Family in the Eighteenth-Century France’ (1980), p. 129. 
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the Code Civil, although it became ‘nearly a dead letter’48 because it was subject to many 
restrictions.49
 The nineteenth century started with the triumphal spread of French divorce law, albeit in 
the moderate form of the Code Civil. The export of the Code Civil as result of the Napoleonic 
conquest nearly harmonised divorce law within the whole50 Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon’s 
dream was ‘one European system, one European Code, one European Cassation Court’.51  
However, the export of divorce law proved not to be equally successful everywhere. In Italy it 
appeared to be a dead letter even before its repeal.52 In contrast, it remained in force in the 
equally Catholic Belgium53 and Luxembourg54 even after its repeal in France in 1916. In Sweden 
the seeds of the Enlightenment fell on the fertile soil of its own rather liberal divorce tradition 
and law influenced by French Revolutionary legislation which survived the Reformation.55   
 Partly due to Napoleon’s expansionist policy, the convergence tendency became more 
prominent during the period following the Enlightenment than during the preceding times. 
Although the Enlightenment, like the Reformation, was a pan-European phenomenon, its 
influence on marriage and divorce law was quite uneven.  In some countries the ideas of 
Enlightened thinkers strongly influenced divorce legislation, like in Prussia, and even produced a 
short-lived liberal breakthrough which was far ahead of its time, like in France. Others, like most 
of the Catholic states56 and England, remained almost immune, at least at the level of positive 
law.   
                                                 
48 Glendon, M. A., ‘The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976’, 24 American Journal of Comparative Law, 1976, p. 
227. 
49 Rheinstein has rightly noted that ‘Napoleon’s Code hid breakdown behind consent’, as mere consent was not 
sufficient for divorce. Consent had to be able to prove ‘that life in common has become unbearable to the spouses’ 
(art. 233 CC). Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1972, p. 212. 
50 Spain was almost the only exception where divorce was not introduced as it was contrary to tradition and 
practices. Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 405. 
51 Propos tenus a Sainte Hélène, cited by Baron Silvercruys in his speech during has inauguration as President of the 
French Constitutional Court. Bull., 1930, p. 7. 
52 Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972), p. 100. 
53 Dumon, W., Kooy, G., Echtscheiding in België en Nederland, Van Loghum Slaterus, Deventer, 1983, 13-14. 
54 NEYENS, M., ‘Entwicklungen in der luxemburger Familiernrechtspolitik’, in: JANS, B. HABISCH, A., STUTZER, E., 
(eds.), Familienwissenschaftliche und damiliernpolitische Signale, Vektor-Verlag, Grafschaft, 2000, p. 616-617. 
55 See: WENDT, F., The Nordic Council and Co-operation in Scandinavia, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1959, p. 17. 
56 Some Catholic states were also influenced by the Enlightenment. In 1781 the Emperor Joseph II of Austria 
introduced civil marriage into Austria’s Italian territories and permitted non-Catholics there to divorce. In 1784 the 
same was permitted in the Austrian Netherlands (later Belgium). Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 201. 
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 The advance of Enlightenment ideas was, however, short-lived. The conservative wave of 
Reformation wiped away the divorce laws in France, Italy and Austria. Still, despite the changing 
tide, divorce remained a central issue in the political debate almost everywhere.57 The whole 
century is coloured by the clashes between the ‘conservative-Christian’ and the ‘liberal-
individualistic’58 attitudes towards divorce.59 Later on, judicial divorce on fault grounds was 
introduced in England in 185760 and restored in France in 1884.61 After the unification of 
Germany divorce by consent and on the ground of the breakdown of marriage previously existing 
in Prussia, and divorce by consent accepted in Prussia and in the Rheinland, were abolished62 so 
that only the fault-based divorce63 survived in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB ) of 1900.64 
The common tendency of that time was that most of divorce laws hardly became more permissive 
than a century before.  
 
The Twentieth Century: ‘contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous’65   
On the eve of the 20th century the common core of the positive law on divorce was, in the first 
place, the almost unanimous rejection of divorce by mutual consent.66 The spouses’ autonomous 
right to decide to terminate their marriage, hesitantly recognised in some preceding divorce laws 
under the influence of the Enlightenment, was discarded and a ‘close statutory and judicial 
                                                 
57 For instance in Italy, after the divorce that was briefly introduced by Napoleon was abolished in 1815, its 
restoration was continually debated and twelve divorce bills were presented to Parliament between 1878 and 1965. 
Sgritta, G., Tufari, P., ‘Italy’, in: Chester, P., Divorce in Europe, Nijhoff, Leiden, 1977, p. 255-526. 
58 Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972), p. 195. 
59 France was the clearest example of such clashes. Divorce was abolished there after the Reformation in 1816 ‘in 
the interest of religion, of morality, of the monarchy, of families’. After that time the ‘passionate propaganda’ for 
restoring divorce resulted in various bills, but they were ‘met by equal passionate counterattacks’. Rheinstein, M., 
Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972), p. 214. 
60 See: Stone, L., Road to Divorce. England 1530-1987 (1990). 
61 Foyer, J., ‘The Reform of Family Law in France’ (1978), p.102-103. 
62 When Germany was unified in 1871 a uniform law had to be enacted for the newly established state. To this end, 
irreconcilable differences between liberal the Prussian divorce law and the indissolubility of marriage in South 
Germany had to be reconciled. Despite the strong dominance of Prussia and the eagerness of Bismarck to roll back 
the influence of the Catholic Church, ‘the final form [of the Civil Code] favoured the conservative-Christian view 
rather than the liberal-individualistic tradition.’ Müller-Freinfels, W., ‘Family Law and the Law of Succession in 
Germany’, 14 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1967, p. 434. 
63 The only exception being insanity.  
64 Müller-Freinfels, W., ‘Family Law and the Law of Succession in Germany’ (1967), p. 434. 
65 I am indebted for this metaphor to F. Rothenbacher.  ‘Social Change in Europe and its Impact of Family 
Structures’, in J. Eekelaar, N. Thandabutu, The Changing Family. International Perspectives on the Family and Family 
Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998, p21. 
66 Divorce by mutual concept, curtailed by restrictions, survived as a rare exception in the counties which retained 
the initial version of the Code Civil: Belgium and Luxembourg.  
 9
control’67 over divorce was restored.’ The divorce laws of all the European countries permitting 
divorce only allowed it upon a number of specific grounds,68 irretrievable breakdown as a general 
rule was unknown. The fault grounds clearly dominated the picture and the no-fault grounds were 
merely exceptions whose applicability was limited by cumbersome restrictions. Apart from these 
common features, the positive laws remained quite diverse as regards permissiveness, as the 
specific grounds varied from adultery alone (England) to a broad number of grounds including 
no-fault ones (Sweden) 69. Most Catholic countries still had no possibility for divorce at all. 
    
Radical Reforms of the 1920s – First Appearance of Divorce on Demand 
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed radical reforms of divorce law in Scandinavia, 
the Soviet Union and Portugal. These regions were different in almost every aspect: religious and 
cultural, economic and social.    
 The first radical reform of divorce law occurred in Portugal in 1910 after the republican 
government had overthrown the king. The newly introduced divorce law70 was rather liberal for 
that time and combined both fault and no-fault grounds, including divorce by mutual consent.71
 In Scandinavia, the second region where divorce was liberalised, the previous divorce law 
was already rather permissive by European standards. In 1910 law commissions were appointed 
 in Norway, Sweden and Denmark in order to work in close co-operation with each other.72 The 
new laws that resulted from this cooperation were very similar, if not identical.73 The common 
feature was the introduction of irretrievable breakdown as a ground for divorce. The conditions 
under which it could be obtained were, however, not exactly the same.74 In Norway, Denmark 
                                                 
67 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 493. 
68 Neumayer, K., ‘General Introduction’, in: Chloros, A., (ed.), The Reform of Family Law in Europe (1978), p. 5.  
69 Divorce by Royal dispensation could, among others, by granted in Sweden when no fault was involved e.g. in case 
of ‘difference of temperament and opinion, which […] turned into disgust and hatred’ between the spouses. Sellin, 
J., Marriage and Divorce Legislation in Sweden, University of Pennsylvania, 1922, p. 36-37. 
70 Decree 3 of November 1910 ‘Divorce Law’. 
71 SOTTOMAYOR, M., ‘The Introduction and Impact of Joint Custody in Portugal’, 13 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family (1999), p. 247. 
72 On the course of this Nordic cooperation see: David, ‘The International Unification of Private Law’, in: 
International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, vol. 2, 65, chapter 5, J.C.B. Mohr, Tubingen, 1971, p. 181- 185. 
73 According to Schmidt and Agell, ‘almost identical’. Schmidt, T., The Scandinavian Law of procedure in 
Matrimonial Causes, in: Eekelaar J.M., Katz N., (eds.) The Resolution of Family Conflicts, Butterwoths, Harvard, 
1984, p. 80; Agell, A., ‘Is There one System of Family Laws in the Nordic Counties’, 3 European Journal of Law 
Reform, 2001, p. 314.   
74 Bradley, Family Law and Political Culture, Scandinavian Laws in Comparative Perspective, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1996, p. 12. 
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and Sweden75 the reforms were the result of co-operation between two dominant political 
movements: the liberal and the social democratic.76 The liberal belief in the autonomous right of 
the spouses to decide for themselves whether and when their marriage had broken down77 was 
clearly influencing Scandinavian law. Conservative opposition was also present,78 but had less 
influence on the reforms than anywhere else in Europe.  
 The third region of early 20th century radical divorce reforms was the Soviet Union. 
Immediately after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 the family law of Russia was drastically 
amended. The moderate conservative divorce law of the Russian Empire was replaced by 
legislation which, for the first time in European history since Roman times, introduced divorce 
on demand. The Decree of December 1917 and later the Family Code of 1918 provided for an 
administrative procedure without any inquiry in the case of a divorce by mutual consent. Court 
jurisdiction was retained for contested divorces, but no proof of the irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage was required.79 The second Russian Family Code of 1926 went even further and 
nearly equated the de facto marriage with the formal one. Consequently, divorce started to be 
regarded merely as a subsidiary means of terminating of both registered and informal 
marriages.80There was a consensus that the spouses could not be kept locked in marriage even if 
one of them was against divorce. The state withdrew from deciding upon the dissolution of 
marriage, leaving it to the autonomous decisions of the spouses themselves.  A marriage was 
dissolved upon the request of one or both of the spouses to terminate the marriage; the 
registration of the divorce was no more than a formality. In line with this approach, the 
administrative procedure without any inquiry was extended to all divorce cases. 
 The place of the Soviet radical reforms in the overall development of family law in 
Europe was met with quite different appreciations among scholars. Some, like Rheinstein81 
                                                 
75 In Finland the reforms were mainly the result of conservative policy.  Bradley, D., ‘Antecedents of Finnish Family 
Laws: Legal Traditions, Political Culture and Social Institutions’, 2 Legal History, 1998, p. 98-110. 
76 Gaunt. D., and Nystrom, L., in: Burguiere, A., et al. (eds.). A History of the Family. Volume II. The impact of 
Modernity. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 480. For a more extensive analysis see: Bradley, D., Family Law and 
Political Culture. Scandinavian Laws in Comparative Perspective, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1996, p. 34- 63. 
77 According to Sellin, if the spouses had agreed that their marriage had failed ‘the court has no right to inquire into 
the nature of the “discord”, which brought the marriage to such an unhappy end’, as “[n]o one knows the condition 
better than the spouses themselves.” Sellin, Marriage and Divorce Legislation in Sweden (1922), p. 79. 
78 For the opposition to the reforms see: Bradley, Family Law and Political Culture. (1996), p. 22-24. 
79 Semidvorkin, N, Sozdanie pervogo brachno-semeinogo kodeksa, MGY, Moskow, 1989, p. 50. 
80 Art. 19 Family Code 1926. 
81 Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972), p. 231-243. 
 11
considered these reforms to be merely excesses of the revolutionary period with rather limited 
significance. Others, like Phillips, suggested that the Soviet reforms had ‘an immediate and 
enduring impact in social and political thought in Western Europe’,82 as they translated into law 
the ideas of Western socialists on marriage, divorce, women, and the family’.83 As I have argued 
elsewhere84, this was not a ‘Bolshevik nonsense’ law. The core of the reforms was exactly in line 
with the general evolution of family law in Europe. It liberated family law from the patriarchal 
heritage and it temporarily introduced the concept of divorce on demand way ahead of time. In a 
sense, the Soviet law of the 1920s was the same kind of radical breakthrough as was the French 
revolutionary legislation of 1792. The clue to its significance is that the reforms were inspired not 
by the Bolsheviks or even socialist ideology alone, but by the ideas shared one way or another 
throughout the whole of the Russian and the European85 progressive movement.  It is possible to 
delineate three distinctive components of the ideological background of the reforms: radical 
secularism, liberal individualism and the socialists’ idea of the ‘dying out of the ‘bourgeois’ 
family’86. Only the latter element was clearly the socialists’ own. The militant atheism of the 
Bolsheviks made the secularisation, longed for by many other leftists as well, excessive and 
drastic and ensured a sweeping break with the traditional Christian concepts of marriage and 
divorce. Liberal individualism was generally alien to Bolshevist ideology. It was, however, 
temporarily taken over from liberal thought and employed for reforming family law.87 This 
reform, even after its partial repeal by Stalin in 1944, kept influencing not only the development 
of divorce law in Eastern Europe, but was also used as one of the models for the Swedish law of 
1973.88  
                                                 
82 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 534. 
83 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 514. 
84 Antokolskaia, M., ‘De ontwikkeling van het Russische familierecht vanaf de Bolsjewistische revolutie: een poging 
tot verklaring’, 70 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 2002, p. 137-171. 
85 ‘Soviet family policy […] found support – qualified and unqualified – across the liberal and socialist spectrum in 
Europe and America. It responded to liberal and socialist hostility to the oppressive character of bourgeois marriage, 
and complemented the socialist feminist critiques of Western family institutions and practices. In this sense the 
Soviet experiments […] reinforced the individualistic tendencies of the Left’s analysis of the family.’ Phillips, R., 
Putting asunder (1988), p. 538. 
86 Outlined by Engels, F., in his The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1985, p. 58-115. 
87 The similar confluence of liberal and social-democratic ideas in respect of family law occurred in Scandinavia in 
the 1920s. Bradley, D., Family Law and Political Culture (1996), p. 9-13. 
88 Sundberg, J., ‘Marriage or no Marriage. The Directives for the Revision of Swedish Family Law’, 20 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1971, p. 233. 
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After the radical reforms of the 1920s the divorce policies in Europe were subjected to 
significant ups and downs.  Philips suggested a strong correlation between the political 
orientation of the regimes between the two World Wars and the attitude towards divorce.89 
Fascists and Pro-fascist regimes in Portugal90, Spain91, Italy92 and France,93and communist 
regime in the Soviet Union94 abolished or restricted divorce in their respective countries. In 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and France the restrictive divorce policies were linked to the eagerness of 
the right-wing governments to win the support of the Catholic Church. On the other hand, the 
conservative twist in divorce policy in the Soviet Union had nothing to do with religion. 
However, the association of conservative attitudes towards divorce with religion was so strong 
that Rheinstein was inclined to search for the roots of Stalin’s counter-reform partly in the 
‘survival of Christian tradition’.95 In my view this was not the case at all. Stalin’s conservative policy 
could be perfectly explained in terms of ‘purely secular statism’96: the desire to roll back individual 
freedom and the shift of emphasis to the corporative element of the ‘the socialist family’, which had 
to be brought under more firm control by the totalitarian state.97  
 Nazi Germany was in some respects a case apart.  The Marriage and Divorce Act 
(Ehegesetz) of 193898 liberalised divorce law and provided for divorce on the ground of the 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage, alongside the old fault grounds. The German circumstances in 
some way resemble the Soviet reform of the 1920s: in both instances a totalitarian regime was 
responsible for liberal divorce reform.  Just like the Russian divorce on demand was more than just 
                                                 
89 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 534. 
90 The Portuguese Catholics were deprived of the right to divorce by the Concordat of 1940, which required them to 
renounce their right of divorce at the time of their marriage. OLIVEIRA, G., de, National Report for Portugal (2003), 
p. 47. 
91 The promulgation of the law on divorce resulted in a bitter controversy between the socialists – republicans, on 
one hand, and conservative Catholics, on the other hand.  However, in 1932 the Republican government managed to 
promulgate a liberal divorce law. LANGNER, D., Eheschließung und Ehescheidung nach spanischem Recht, Peter 
Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1984, p. 9. The fascist government of Franco, which seized power in 1938, almost 
immediately repealed this law with retroactive affect. 
92 The fascist regime of Mussolini abolished divorce even in territories, annexed after World War I, where it had 
been allowed for non-Catholics. Sgritta, G., Tufari, P., ‘Italy’, in: Chester, P., Divorce in Europe, 1977, p. 258. 
93 The Vichy government prohibited applying for divorce during the first three years of marriage. Foyer, J., ‘The 
Reform of Family Law in France’ (1978), p. 103. 
94 In 1944 Stalin’s regime made divorce law less permissive (but still quite liberal, according to the average 
European standard of those days). 
95 Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972), p. 236. 
96 Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972), p. 236. 
97 See also: M. Antokolskaia, ‘De ontwikkeling van het Russische familierecht vanaf de Bolsjewistische revolutie: 
een poging tot verklaring’, 70 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 2002, p. 137-151. 
98 This law was also applicable in Austria which had been made a part of Germany at that time. 
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‘Bolshevik law’, the law of 1928 was not merely ‘Nazi law’. One of its principle sources was the 
‘reform ideas developed during the 1920s not least of all by modern social investigations, 
undogmatic secular value judgements and comparative reference to the Scandinavian countries 
and Switzerland’.99 However, the Nazi preoccupation with racial purity and eugenics was also 
discernible in the new German law.100
  Another important development was the growing accessibility of divorce due to the 
creeping relaxation of divorce law within the framework of fault-based divorce. In most of the 
European countries very undramatic changes in statutory or case law led to rather far-reaching 
consequences. They opened the gate to a notable discrepancy between divorce law in the books 
and its use in practice. As a result, the countries with restrictive divorce laws which solely 
provided for divorce upon a matrimonial offence found themselves confronted with the rise of 
mass consensual divorce by collusion.101  
 On the eve of the no-fault reforms the Western European countries had rather different 
divorce provisions but quite a similar problem: mass consensual divorce by collusion.  
 
No-fault reforms of the 1960s-1970s 
The 1960s witnessed profound cultural changes, in some respects comparable with the changes 
brought about by the French and Russian Revolutions. The traditional family values were no 
longer taken for granted and the traditional family pattern was challenged by both the sexual 
revolution, feminism and the re-emergence of individualism. In this new situation the reforming 
of divorce underwent a major change: if before this time the liberalisation of divorce law was 
                                                 
99 Müller-Freinfels, W., ‘Family Law and the Law of Succession in Germany’ (1967), p. 412. 
100 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 550. 
101 In France the false accusation of adultery was used as the shortest road to divorce, ‘Spouses agreed on divorce, 
they then invented fictitious grievances, wrote letters about false injuries, sometimes dictated by their respective 
lawyers, and the judges closed their eyes to the comedy.’ (Foyer, J., ‘The Reform of Family Law in France’ (1978), 
p. 106.) In England, the situation started to resemble the French since in 1923 wives obtained the possibility to apply 
for divorce on the ground of a simple case of adultery by the husband. (Stone, L., Road to Divorce. England 1530-
1987 (1990), p. 397.)101 Germany was ahead of the aforementioned countries, as it already had a mixed system of 
divorce based on fault and on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. However, another tendency manifested 
itself here. A divorce based on irretrievable breakdown without an allegation of fault was more cumbersome than 
divorce based upon a matrimonial offence. Thus in 80 to 90 percent of all divorce cases (Giesen, D., ‘Divorce 
Reform in Germany’, Giesen, D., ‘Divorce Reform in Germany’, 4 Family Law Quarterly, 1973, p. 353.) the 
spouses did not wait for three years for no-fault divorce, ‘but looked for an easy and immediate divorce on the 
ground of some trumped-up matrimonial offence.’ (Müller-Freinfels, W., ‘Family Law and the Law of Succession in 
Germany’ (1967), p. 441.) 
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mainly a ‘steady accumulation of specific grounds, often specific matrimonial offences and 
conditions,’ 102 now it took the shape of the introduction of the no-fault divorce. 
 The problem with divorce exclusively based on fault was not so much the hypocrisy 
surrounding the consensual divorce. The real trouble was with contested divorce. Firstly, the 
humiliating accusational procedure increased aversion and bitterness among the spouses and 
made their intimate life the subject of public scrutiny. Secondly, the ‘guilty’ spouse was, at least 
in theory, not entitled to obtain a divorce if an ‘innocent’ spouse opposed it.  These 
inconveniences became less tolerable for the progressively minded populace in the revived spirit 
of individual freedom and the search for happiness and self-fulfilment typical for the new cultural 
climate of the 1960s. The right to dissolve an unhappy marriage was seen as a logical end of the 
right of every individual to seek happiness. From this individualistic perspective, the ‘state had 
no right to prevent its citizens from perusing such happiness’ and ‘to make impossible or 
cumbersome the exercise of the natural right of divorce.’103 The conservatives were concerned 
not so much with the hypocrisy of divorce by collusion, but with the ease of such divorce and the 
increase in the of the divorce rates. They still firmly believed that the State had ‘an interest in the 
continuation of a marriage over and above the wishes of the parties involved’,104 and that the 
divorce law should ensure these interests. Thus the reforms of the 1960s-1970s were no less 
dominated by the progressive-conservative discord than was the case a century before. 
  In England divorce reform was preceded by two important reports: one105 by the group 
appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury106, and another by the Law Commission.107 Both the 
Law Commission and the Group of the Archbishop agreed that a matrimonial offence as the 
ground for a divorce should be replaced by the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. They also 
shared the objective that a good divorce law has to ‘buttress rather than undermine the stability of 
marriage’ and ‘to enable the empty shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness, and the 
minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.’108 The groups differed, however, as to what 
                                                 
102 Phillips, R., Putting asunder (1988), p. 563. 
103 Rheinstein, M., Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (1972),p. 196. 
104 Lee, B., Divorce Reform in England, Peter Owen, London, 1974, p. 198. 
105 Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society S.P.C.K., London, 1966. 
106 This was an enormous step on the part of the Church of England, which did not revoke its doctrine of the 
indissolubility of marriage, but generally acknowledged that the secular law may differ on this point from the law of 
the Church. 
107 Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice, Law Commission, 1966, Cmnd 3123, No, 6. 
108 Law Commission, The Field of Choice, p. 10. 
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should be the role of the state in ascertaining such a breakdown. The Archbishop’s Group 
rejected the very idea that the agreement of the spouses alone could be sufficient proof of the 
breakdown. According to its report, this ‘idea would virtually repudiate the community’s interest 
in the stability of marriage, because a judge (the community representative) would take no 
effectual part in the proceedings.’109 Therefore the Group initially proposed a full inquest in 
every divorce case.110 The Law Commission considered such an inquest to be ‘procedurally 
impracticable’ and initially proposed that the evidence of the breakdown would be derived from 
the period of separation and the absence of evidence to the contrary.111 The compromise reached 
between the two groups resulted in the Law of 1969: the breakdown without an inquest, but ‘on 
proof of the existence of certain circumstances.’112 As a result ‘the practical proposals to 
implement this new principle [irretrievable breakdown] were as conservative as the idea itself 
was radical.’113 Three ‘circumstances’ were the same old fault grounds: adultery and cruelty 
(which was now called ‘unreasonable behaviour’) and desertion. In addition there were no-fault 
circumstances: two years of separation followed by an application for divorce by mutual consent, 
and five-years of separation followed by an unilateral application, contested by the other spouse. 
The strict control of divorce was reinforced by the introduction of a hardship clause.  
 In Germany it became widely agreed in the 1970s that the ‘matrimonial offence principle 
has proved a failure’, ‘because it aggravates, rather than solves problems in many cases.’114 The 
principal debates115 concerned the same question as in England: what should be the role of the 
state in establishing the breakdown. Like in England, it was proposed to introduce the 
irretrievable breakdown with inquiry as a general rule.116 The Congress of Representatives of the 
German Legal Profession (Deutscher Juristentag) rejected the inquiry and therefore the general 
rule and proposed a fixed period of separation as proof of the breakdown.117 The resulting law 
                                                 
109 Lee, B., Divorce Reform in England (1974), p. 51. 
110 Lee, B., Divorce Reform in England (1974), p. 46. 
111 Law Commission, The Field of Choice, p. 53.  
112 Lee, B., Divorce Reform in England (1974), p. 73. 
113 Stone, L., Road to Divorce. England 1530-1987 (1990), p. 307. 
114 Giesen, D., ‘Divorce Reform in Germany’, 4 Family Law Quarterly, 1973, p. 353. 
115 There were also more radical proposals from complete contractual freedom for the dissolution of marriage to 
divorce by mutual consent if certain conditions were satisfied. Giesen, D., ‘Divorce Reform in Germany’ (1973), p. 
355. 
116 Giesen, D., ‘Divorce Reform in Germany’ (1973), p. 355. 
117 Giesen, D., ‘Divorce Reform in Germany’ (1973), p. 358. 
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was generally a compromise.118 Irretrievable breakdown became the sole ground for divorce. In 
the case of divorce by agreement, if the spouses had been separated for at least one year, then the 
breakdown was presumed. Giesen stressed that the only real purpose this one-year delay was ‘to 
serve the scruples of those who disapprove of divorce by mutual consent’, which remained highly 
controversial, as undermining the stability of marriage.119 The accessibility of divorce by 
agreement was restricted by the requirement that such agreement should include a proposal 
agreement on ancillary matters. 120 If the spouses had lived apart for three years, this constituted 
an irrefutable presumption of marital breakdown.121 However, a hardship clause allowed the 
court to postpone the dissolution of a marriage in exceptional circumstances.122  
 When divorce reform started to be contemplated in France in the 1970s there were, 
according to Glendon, still ‘les deux Frances’.123 The spirit of the French Revolution ‘was 
flourishing in some of the learned writings, and the divorce proposals of the socialist and 
communist parties were seeking to eliminate fault divorce completely and replace it with divorce 
for objective grounds.’124 The conservatives opposed these ideas and the general public was 
hopelessly split.125 Therefore a divorce law based solely on objective grounds was rendered 
impossible.126 As a result, the French divorce law provided for a mixed system: divorce à la 
carte,127 retaining the fault-based divorce alongside divorce by mutual consent and divorce on the 
ground of the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage proved by six-years’ separation.  
 Alongside the introduction of no-fault divorce in the countries with a more or less long- 
standing divorce tradition, no-fault divorce was adopted by some the countries which previously 
had no divorce at all. In Italy, Portugal (for the Catholics) and Spain divorce was reintroduced 
respectively in 1970, 1977 and 1981 based upon both fault and non-fault divorce. In contrast, 
                                                 
118 Müller-Freinfels, W., ‘The Marriage Law Reform of 1976 in the Federal Republic of Germany’, 28 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1979, p. 185. 
119 Giesen, D., ‘Divorce Reform in Germany’ (1973), p. 358. The proponents of divorce by consent responded that 
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Ireland instantly embraced the principle of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in its law of 
1996.  
 Quite out of pace with the rest of Europe, Sweden took a radical step in the liberalisation 
of divorce law by introducing divorce on demand. In the mid-1960s a ‘new radicalism’ had come 
to dominate Swedish politics.128 The Swedish minister of justice laid down in the directive for the 
experts appointed to prepare the new legislation that ‘legislation should not under any 
circumstances force a person to continue to live under a marriage from which he wishes to free 
himself’. 129 The concept of fault also ought to disappear entirely from the Swedish divorce law’. 
The resulting law of 1973 provided that in the case of unilateral divorce or when the spouses had 
minor children, a divorce was to be automatically granted after a six-month period of reflection 
without any inquiry into the reasons for the divorce.130  If both spouses agreed to divorce and no 
minor children were involved, a divorce had to be granted immediately.131 Although not 
everyone agreed with the ‘rationale that adult independent spouses do not need any time for 
reflection’,132 the adherence to spouses’ autonomy seemed to be not the only reason for the 
introduction of immediate divorce. Another more pragmatic reason was the competition between 
the institution of marriage and the greatly increased number of incidences of unmarried 
cohabitation, which could be cancelled without any delay and without any intervention by the 
state.133 Thus, partly due to ideological, partly due to pragmatic reasons, the legislator patently 
broke with the traditional role of the state in granting a divorce and chose a non-interventionist 
policy.134 As Bradley noted, it was conceded that ‘marriage and divorce law […] could not 
influence behaviour and should not do so’.135 The Swedish system openly left behind the concept 
of irretrievable breakdown and started to speak of divorce in terms of an entitlement and a 
                                                                                                                                                              
127 Glendon, M. A., ‘The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976’ (1976), p. 199. 
128 Abstract of protocol in justice department matters, 15 Augustus 1969, p. 4. Cited in: Sundberg, J., ‘Marriage or 
no Marriage. The Directives for the Revision of Swedish Family Law’ (1971), p. 232.  
129 Abstract of protocol in justice department matters, 15 Augustus 1969. Cited in: Sundberg, J., ‘Marriage or no 
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130 Lögdber, A., ‘The Reform of Family Law in the Scandinavian Countries’ in: Chloros, A., (ed.), The Reform of 
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131 Lögdber, A., ‘The Reform of Family Law in the Scandinavian Countries’ (1978), p. 206. 
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with the Soviet reforms of the 1920s inspired the Swedish legislator. Sundberg, J., ‘Marriage or no Marriage. The 
Directives for the Revision of Swedish Family Law’ (1971), p. 233. 
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right.136 It was also deliberately chosen not to base the legislation on a certain set of family 
values, but on respect for individual values of different couples.137  
 Divorce on demand was also openly introduced in Finland in 1987.138 As Finnish lawyers 
presented the situation: ‘the only “ground for divorce” is simply a request for a divorce by means 
of a written application by both spouses or by one of them renewed after a six-month mandatory 
period of reflection’.139
 Divorce on demand was indirectly introduced in Russia by the Family Code of 1995. 
Although the legal literature still speaks of the irretrievable breakdown of marriage,140 in fact the 
joint request for divorce by the spouses is the true divorce ground in both the administrative and 
the judicial procedure (the latter is applicable when minor children are involved).141 In both cases 
neither the civil servant, nor the judge is entitled to make any enquiry into the reasons for the 
divorce and is obliged to grant a divorce one month after the application. The existence of 
divorce on demand in the case of a contested divorce is a matter of doctrinal controversy.142  
 
The fallacy of the fault-no-fault dichotomy 
It is remarkable that the no-fault movement in the 1970s is repeatedly used both by proponents 
and by opponents of the convergence thesis in their advantage. On the one hand, the advance of 
no-fault divorce in the last half of the 20th century has been pointed to as evidence of 
convergence.143 On the other hand, the existence of convergence is sometimes denied because, in 
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spite of the similar general trend toward no-fault divorce, the results of these reforms were not 
exactly the same in every country. 144   
The triumphal advance of no-fault divorce throughout Western Europe evoked the idea 
that Europe is moving towards a spontaneous harmonisation of family law.145 In the beginning it 
looked indeed rather optimistic: in 1960 fault-based divorce existed in thirteen Western European 
countries, divorce upon the irretrievable breakdown of marriage in seven, and mutual consent 
divorce in six,146 while four countries allowed no divorce at all. ‘Twenty years later fault grounds 
had been retained in eight jurisdictions, and no-fault divorce had extended to twelve, as had 
mutual consent divorce.’147 However, as the turn of millennium approached, the no-fault 
movement, gradually lost most of its vigour. The attempts to get rid of the fault grounds in 
England in Wales in 1996,148 in France 2005,149 and in Belgium150 have failed. Two Eastern-
European countries: Latvia,151 Lithuania152 have recently introduced fault grounds in their 
divorce law. This retroactive movement is consonant with the situation in regard of the covenant 
marriages in the US.153
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150 In Belgium the discussion surrounding divorce reform is still in process, but it is getting more and more clear that 
the fault grounds will remain.  
151 Introduced in 1993 by the restored Latvian Civil Code of 1937 (art. 71-72 and 74). 
152 Introduced by art. 3.60 of the 2000 Civil Code of Lithuania (in force since 1 July 2001) KASERAUSKAS, Š., 
‘Moving in the Same Direction’? Presentation of Family Law Reforms in Lithuania’ (2004). 330-331. 
153 Three American states, Louisiana (in 1991), Arizona (in 1999) and Arkansas (in 2001), have retreated from no-
fault divorce by adopting legislation allowing a couple at the time of marriage to sign a ‘covenant marriage’ 
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 A no-fault divorce - a divorce-remedy was such a change compared to the fault-based 
divorce sanction, that there was a strong temptation to keep viewing the map of European divorce 
law mainly in the light of the fault-no-fault dichotomy. However, with the time passing it appeared 
that reality is much more complicated. As long as many countries allowed divorce exclusively on 
the ground of fault, this approach had its merits, as in such a situation the ‘innocent’ spouse had no 
other option than an infringing accusational procedure while the ‘guilty’ spouse had no option at 
all except to purchase or coerce the cooperation of the ‘innocent’ party.  Since nowadays not a 
single European country retains fault-based divorce as a sole ground,154 the situation has utterly 
changed. The invocation of fault is now only one of the options among many, often providing the 
shortest route to a divorce.155 Thus, although retaining fault grounds still has its symbolic 
meaning,156 it no longer says a great deal about the divorce law of a particular country, and getting 
rid of such grounds does not automatically mean that divorce becomes any easier. The unsuccessful 
attempt to remove fault grounds in England and Wales157 provides a good example. The current law 
offers the spouses the possibility to obtain a fault-based divorce within four to six months,158 
whereas the repealed provisions of The Family Law Act of 1996 made it impossible to obtain a 
divorce decree earlier than after a one-year period of ‘reflection’, which was to be extended by six 
months even for consenting spouses if they had children. In addition, although the Act removed 
the need to prove a reason for the breakdown of the marriage, the new system insisted that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
agreement, stating that they voluntary restrict the grounds for possible future divorce to fault grounds. See: Maxwell, 
N., ‘Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law Principles: The United States Experience’, in:  Boele-Woelki, K. 
(ed), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, European Family Law Series 
No. 4, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003, p. 263-264.     
154 Martiny, D., ‘Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses - Initial Results of the Commission on 
European Family Law’, in:  Boele-Woelki, K. (ed), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of Family 
Law in Europe, European Family Law Series No. 4, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2003, p. 534. 
155 Cretney, S., Masson, J., Bailey-Harris, R., Principles of Family Law (2002), p. 299, note 95. 
156 During the Parliamentary debates on the eradication of fault from English divorce law one of the main opponents 
in the House of Lords, Baroness Young, said that: ‘The message of no fault is clear. It is that breaking marriage 
vows, breaking a civil contract, does not matter. It undermines individual responsibility. It is an attack upon decent 
behaviour and fidelity. It violates common sense and creates injustice for anyone who believes in guilt and 
innocence’, Hansard (HL), vol 569, col 1638. Similar criticism met the French Bill designed to introduce no-fault 
divorce. See: Mahe, C., ‘De Franse wetgever op weg naar afschaffing van “schuldscheiding”, 1 Tijdschrift voor 
Familie- en Jeugdrecht, 2002, p. 20-22.  
157 See: Cretney, S., Masson, J., Bailey-Harris, R., Principles of Family Law (2002), p. 197-309. 
158 Fourth Annual Report of Advisory Board in Family Law, 2000/2001, para 3.5. Cited in: Cretney, S., Masson, J., 
Bailey-Harris, R., Principles of Family Law (2002), p. 299, note 95. 
 21
couple should settle ancillary matters beforehand, ‘which may be much harder than proving 
adultery, behaviour or separation.’159
 
What’s in a Name? Looking Through the Concept of Irretrievable Breakdown 
The most recent survey of the current divorce law in Europe provided by the CEFL National 
Reports,160 reveals a phenomenon, which, paraphrasing Zweigert and Kötz, can be called 
‘functional disequivalence’. It is easy to see that, confusingly enough, under one and the same 
designation of ‘irretrievable breakdown’161 virtually every type of divorce can be hidden, from 
fault-based (England and Wales, Scotland, Greece and partly also Poland and Bulgaria) to 
divorce by consent (The Netherlands, Russia). If we look beyond these labels, we can roughly 
distinguish five more or less pure functional types of divorce grounds: fault-based grounds, 
irretrievable breakdown in the narrow sense of this term, divorce on the ground of separation162 
for a stated period of time, divorce by consent and divorce on demand.  
 The fault-based divorce in theory presupposes a court enquiry into a matrimonial offence, 
but the strictness of this inquiry has been watered down over the course of time. For instance, in 
England and Wales, the so-called special procedure under which undefended divorces are granted 
without any court hearing 163 more resembles an administrative divorce others than the old-
fashioned divorce trials. That, combined with the possibility to obtain divorce immediately, 
sometimes makes fault-based divorce and attractive form, even for consenting spouses.  
 Divorce upon an irretrievable breakdown in the narrow sense is granted upon the 
subjective criterion alone: when the court is convinced that that marriage cannot be saved 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Poland, Hungary etc.), or upon the subjective as 
well as the objective criterion: a certain period of separation (four years in Ireland, three years in 
Austria, two years in Belgium etc.).  In the jurisdictions that prescribe the subjective criterion 
alone, the court inquiry is nearly a dead letter in non-contested cases; however, in contested cases 
                                                 
159 Hale, B., ‘The Family Law Act 1996 – the death of marriage?’ in: Bridge, C., Family Law Towards the 
Millennium: Essays for P M Bromley, Butterworths, London, 1997, p. 9. 
160 See note 8.  
161 On the analysis of the grounds for the breakdown of marriage as it is apparent from the CEFL National Reports 
see: Martiny, D., ‘Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses - Initial Results of the Commission on 
European Family Law’ 2003, p. 537-540. 
162 The term separation is used to denote the variable concepts of cessation of marital life as used in different 
jurisdictions.  
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it may be quite intrusive, especially in countries like Bulgaria and Poland where allocation of the 
fault is required.164 In the jurisdictions that combine subjective (convincing the court or other 
competent authority) and objective (period of separation) criteria, proving the breakdown is twice 
as difficult, as even after the stated period of separation has expired, the court could refuse a 
divorce if it is not convinced that the marriage has irretrievably broken down.  
 The jurisdictions where divorce is to be granted after the simple expiry of the stated 
period of separation often call this an irrefutable presumption of the irretrievable breakdown of a 
marriage, but sometimes consider it a separate ground (Norway). In both cases, however, a 
divorce is granted automatically and without further inquiry. The accessibility of divorce 
basically depends on the length of the separation period.  These periods vary quite significantly: 
six years in Austria, England and Wales and in Scotland, four years in Switzerland and Greece, 
three years in Italy and Portugal, two years in Germany and France and one year in Denmark, 
Norway and Iceland. As in most of the jurisdictions these periods are rather lengthy, this form of 
divorce is not really attractive if a shorter route is available to the spouses. 
 Divorce by consent is in some jurisdictions covered under the designation of irretrievable 
breakdown, and constitutes an irrefutable presumption thereof (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, England and Wales, Russia, Scotland).  In other countries 
consent is presented as a separate ground (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Portugal). In both 
cases the court with competent authority grants divorce automatically and without inquiry into 
the reasons for divorce if the spouses have agreed thereon. However, most of the states still 
consider divorce by consent as dangerously diminishing the state control of divorce. The multiple 
restrictions of the right of divorce by consent often make it a less attractive and speedy form of 
divorce. Only Dutch and Russian law allows divorce on the ground of simple consent without 
any further restrictions.  In some countries the marriage has to be of a certain duration: three 
years in Bulgaria, two years in Belgium, one year in Czech Republic and Greece. Other countries 
allow consensual divorce only after a certain period of separation, two years in England and 
Wales and in Scotland, one year in Germany and six months in Denmark, Czech Republic and 
Iceland. In most countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Denmark, 
                                                                                                                                                              
163 Cretney, S., ‘Divorce Reform in England: Humbug and Hypocrisy or a Smooth Transition?’, in: Freeman, M., 
(ed), Divorce: Where Next, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996,  note 19, p. 56. 
164 Todorova, V., National Report for Bulgaria (2003), p. 406-408; Mączyński, A., Sokołowsli, T., National Report 
for Poland in: Grounds for Divorce (2003), p. 194. 
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Portugal) an agreement to divorce alone is not sufficient and the spouses are required to reach an 
agreement on ancillary matters as well. This list of restrictions reveals that most of the countries 
are still reluctant to recognise the autonomous decisions of the spouses alone as a sufficient 
ground for divorce. The state in one way or another has to protect the spouses from their own 
‘inconsiderate’165decisions.       
 Divorce on demand where each of the spouses is simply considered to be entitled to divorce, 
irrespective of the objections of the other spouse, is explicitly recognised in Sweden and Finland 
and, perhaps, indirectly in Russia. This is, beyond doubt, the easiest form of divorce, fully 
respecting the autonomous decisions of the spouses (one of them) and accepting as a fact that the 
state is not capable of keeping marriage intact against the will of even one of the spouses. The only 
state intervention in this kind of divorce is a short waiting period of six months for contested 
divorces or divorces with minor children in Sweden and for all divorces in Finland, and a possibility 
of a three-month reconciliation period for contested divorces under Russian law.  
 Many countries have not just one, but multiple grounds for divorce. In this case especially 
the consenting spouses have the possibility of a kind of ‘ground shopping’. Empirical data seems to 
suggest that spouses, assisted by their lawyers, are always able to choose the shortest way to 
divorce as water will always find its way to the lowest point. 166
 This rough survey illustrates that  if, in spite of all the optimistic expectations from the no-
fault reforms, no substantial common core has so far emerged. Even if the fault grounds would 
completely disappear from the picture in the foreseeable future, this event alone would not 
significantly increase the scope of the common core. 
 
Conclusion: is there a convergence tendency or not? 
The history of divorce law during the last half-millennium clearly shows a general development 
of divorce law in Europe in the same direction: from more restrictive to more permissive.167 It is 
                                                 
165 Martiny, D., ‘Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses - Initial Results of the Commission on 
European Family Law’ (2003), p. 536. Martiny also notes that ‘consent seems to be a dangerous kind of marriage 
dissolution’. Ibid. 
166 For instance, in England and Wales 68.6 % are granted upon fault grounds. (Lowe, N., National Report for 
England and Wales in: Grounds for Divorce (2003), p. 103), as this proves to be the shortest route to a divorce. see 
note 155.   
167 See also H. Willekens: ‘Changes in different legal systems do not take place simultaneously nor at the same pace, 
but when change occurs the direction is always the same’. ‘Explaining Two Hundred Years of Family Law in 
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also visible that the choices, the ideological background and the political colour of the principle 
participants in the divorce debates are the same everywhere. This overall development towards 
modernisation has been perceived by some proponent of convergence as the evidence of 
convergence on a general level.168 At the same time, the fact that there has always been a significant 
divergence in the profundity and pace of modernisation of family laws from one European country 
to another, has been used by the opponents of the convergence theory as evidence that family laws 
do not converge.  It is important, however, to keep in mind a clear distinction between two 
questions: whether or not there is a tendency towards modernisation of divorce laws in Europe; and 
whether of not there is a tendency towards convergence of divorce laws. Considering the history, 
the general movement towards modernisation undeniably exists. But this does not necessarily 
implies a tendency towards convergence. The established the existence of convergence one must 
manage to prove that, while the divorce laws of the European countries are moving in the same 
direction, the differences between those laws are steadily diminishing in the course of the time. On 
a short-term basis certain periods of convergence of divorce law can certainly be discerned. The 
expansion of Napoleon’s divorce law in the early eighteenth century, or the recent spontaneous 
no-fault movement, provide good examples thereof. A more broad historical perspective 
however, reveals that on the long-term basis there is no indication that the level of similarity of 
divorce laws became higher in our times, than it was, lets say, a hundred-fifty years ago. Let me 
give an illustration. In the mid-nineteenth century a considerable number of European countries 
admitted no divorce at all. The majority of European countries provided for divorce on a limited 
number of predominantly fault grounds. No-fault grounds, like irretrievable breakdown or 
consent, were mere exceptions. Divorce was rare and quite difficult to obtain. Today the picture 
is rather different. Malta, the only European country that does not provide for a full divorce, can 
be seen as a mere relict. Fault grounds are still present in a considerable minority of divorce laws, 
but no European country maintains fault as the sole divorce ground. The liberalisation of divorce 
throughout the analysed period is therefore manifest. There is, however, no evidence that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Western Europe’ (1997), p. 60. See in the same sense also my ‘Development of Family Law in Western and Eastern 
Europe: Common Origins, Common Driving Forces, Common Tendencies’ (2003), p. 52-69. 
168 I defended this view earlier in my previous works: ‘Geschiedenis van het familierecht: gelijke ontwikkeling’ 
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differences between the divorce laws in the beginning of the period were greater than at the end 
thereof. The current map of divorce laws in Europe shows that these laws encompass all 
generations: fault-based divorce; divorce due to irretrievable breakdown; divorce by consent and 
divorce on demand. One hundred-fifty year ago the most conservative countries did not allow 
divorce at all, while the most progressive countries provided for divorce by mutual consent or 
irretrievable breakdown, albeit surrounded by numerous restriction. In our days the most 
conservative county: Malta still has failed to introduce divorce. Even if we leave Malta aside, 
there is a major difference between, for instance, the Irish law, on one hand, where the spouses 
have to wait for a divorce for four years and even then the court is entitled to refuse the divorce if 
it is not convinced that the breakdown of the marriage is irretrievable or that the financial 
provisions for the spouse and any dependent members of the family are sufficient,169 and the 
Swedish immediate divorce on demand, on the other hand. This difference exists not just on the 
level of positive law, but also on a deep ideological level.170 Thus the common core of divorce 
law in Europe is at the current stage probably even more limited,171 than it was hundred-fifty year 
ago. The explanation is that, although the tendency towards modernisation of divorce influences 
every European country, the pace of proceeding from stage to stage within the progressive 
development of divorce law is different.172 This difference in pace seems to be a permanent 
factor. The historical sketch above shows that while the countries that render behind make a step 
towards modernisation of family law (e.g introducing no-fault divorce), the vanguard countries 
make a further step forward (like introducing divorce on demand) so that the gap between them 
persists. When Phillips systematised divorce law in 1986, he felt that the newly introduced 
extremely permissive Swedish divorce law did not fit within his scheme. What he then perceived 
as breaking ‘with the trend toward divorce law uniformity in Western Europe’,173 was in fact the 
                                                 
169 Shannon, J., National Report for Republic of Ireland (2003), p. 84-86. 
170 As Glendon has rightly mentioned, a legal system that requires a spouse to wait for several years for a divorce 
[…] is obviously promoting a different ideology on marriage from that fostered in a country where divorce is 
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beginning of a new generation of divorce laws: divorce on demand. The well-known paradox of 
Zeno asks whether or not Achilles could overtake a tortoise, but it is quite clear that a tortoise 
could hardly ever overtake Achilles, unless it suddenly gets wings. In the field of divorce law 
there are some historical examples of tortoises suddenly getting wings and overtaking Achilles. 
Such were the breakthroughs in modernisation of divorce law after the Russian and Portuguese 
revolutions. But these are more exceptions than rules. Normally the tortoises (generally the South 
European countries plus Ireland) remain slow and the Achilleses (e.g. the Scandinavian countries 
and Russia) keep moving fast. While the countries lagging behind in the liberalisation of divorce 
are approaching one stage, the vanguard has already moved to the next, and in this way the 
distance persists and the common core on the level of positive law remains limited. 
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